<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Security on Danilo Falcão da Silva</title><link>https://falcao.org/tags/security/</link><description>Recent content in Security on Danilo Falcão da Silva</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 14:35:00 -0300</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://falcao.org/tags/security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Kubernetes Operator's Batman Utility Belt: Day-2 Tools That Actually Earn Their Keep</title><link>https://falcao.org/posts/batman-belt-kubernetes-tools/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 14:35:00 -0300</pubDate><guid>https://falcao.org/posts/batman-belt-kubernetes-tools/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;code>kubectl&lt;/code> is the Swiss Army knife. Nobody disputes this. But Swiss
Army knives are terrible at most of the individual jobs they claim to
do, and &lt;code>kubectl&lt;/code> is no different: it can tail logs, but only one pod
at a time. It can switch contexts, but with zero guardrails. It can
describe resources, but in a wall of YAML that buries the thing you
actually care about.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Day-2 operations — the part where the cluster is live, traffic is
flowing, and someone pages you at 2 a.m. — need sharper instruments.
What follows is the utility belt I&amp;rsquo;d recommend to any Kubernetes
operator building their toolkit in 2026. Not everything here is new.
Some of these tools have been around since 2018. The point is that
they&amp;rsquo;re still maintained, still solve real problems, and still faster
than the &lt;code>kubectl&lt;/code> incantation you&amp;rsquo;d otherwise be typing.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>AI Bug Reports: The Real Vulnerability Is That We Weren't Looking Hard Enough</title><link>https://falcao.org/posts/ai-bug-discovery-revolution/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 10:00:00 -0300</pubDate><guid>https://falcao.org/posts/ai-bug-discovery-revolution/</guid><description>&lt;p>On May 18, 2026, Linus Torvalds called the Linux kernel security mailing list &lt;strong>&amp;ldquo;almost entirely unmanageable.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/strong> The reason: a flood of AI-generated bug reports. The reaction was predictable — ban AI, blame researchers, declare the tools aren&amp;rsquo;t ready.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>I &lt;a href="https://falcao.org/posts/ai-bug-reports-open-source/">wrote about the maintenance crisis last week&lt;/a> and I think that framing misses the deeper story. The problem is not that AI is generating too many reports. &lt;strong>The problem is that the code was more broken than we thought, and for twenty years nobody had the tools to look at it properly.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Replacing Snyk with Open Source: SAST, DAST and SCA in 2026</title><link>https://falcao.org/posts/open-source-sast-dast-sca-2026/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 10:00:00 -0300</pubDate><guid>https://falcao.org/posts/open-source-sast-dast-sca-2026/</guid><description>&lt;p>I don&amp;rsquo;t pay for Snyk. Not because it&amp;rsquo;s bad — it&amp;rsquo;s a genuinely good
product — but because there is a free stack that catches the vast
majority of the same issues directly in CI, and the remaining gap
hasn&amp;rsquo;t been worth roughly &lt;strong>$600 per developer per year&lt;/strong> to close.
On a team of fifteen engineers, that&amp;rsquo;s the price of a small EC2
fleet you actually need.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This post is about the open-source security tooling I actually wire
into pipelines: &lt;strong>Trivy&lt;/strong> for containers, dependencies and IaC,
&lt;strong>Semgrep&lt;/strong> for application code, &lt;strong>Nuclei&lt;/strong> and &lt;strong>OWASP ZAP&lt;/strong> for
the live app, and a few honourable mentions. It&amp;rsquo;s not an exhaustive
catalogue. It&amp;rsquo;s the stack I keep coming back to.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>AI Bug Reports Are Drowning Open Source — And the Fix Isn't 'Stop Using AI'</title><link>https://falcao.org/posts/ai-bug-reports-open-source/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 10:00:00 -0300</pubDate><guid>https://falcao.org/posts/ai-bug-reports-open-source/</guid><description>&lt;p>On May 18, 2026, Linus Torvalds said the Linux kernel security mailing
list had become &lt;strong>&amp;ldquo;almost entirely unmanageable&amp;rdquo;&lt;/strong> because of duplicate
AI-generated bug reports. Two months earlier, longtime stable
maintainer &lt;strong>Willy Tarreau&lt;/strong> had already shared the numbers: a list
that received two to three reports per week in 2024 was getting
&lt;strong>five to ten reports per day&lt;/strong> by March 2026. In January, &lt;strong>Daniel
Stenberg shut down the curl bug bounty&lt;/strong> after the valid-report rate
on HackerOne dropped from above 15% to below 5%, with twenty
submissions in 21 days — seven of them in one 16-hour window — and
zero real vulnerabilities among them.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>